Douglas Weigher v. Prison Health Services by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-23-2010 
Douglas Weigher v. Prison Health Services 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"Douglas Weigher v. Prison Health Services" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 207. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/207 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
GLD-035        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3089 
 ___________ 
 
 DOUGLAS KEITH WEIGHER, 








 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 3:09-cv-00418) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 12, 2010 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 







This is an appeal from the District Court‟s grant of defendants‟ motion to dismiss.  




In 2009, Douglas Weigher, an inmate at the State Correctional Institute at 
Rockview (“Rockview”), filed a pro se civil rights action in the District Court pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Weigher alleged that Prison Health Services, Inc. (“PHS”),  Physician 
Assistant (“PA”) Aaron Thompson, and Dr. John Symons provided inadequate medical 
treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  In his 
original complaint, Weigher claimed that he had an “inflamed and ruptured disc” that 
resulted in numbness in his legs and toes.  In his amended complaint, Weigher asserted 
that his “back went out” while working a prison job, and that he went through eight 
months of pain and suffering before medical staff attended to his back problem.  More 
specifically, Weigher claimed that Dr. Symons avoided Weigher for four months, and 
then saw him when his back went out and prescribed him ineffective pain medication.  
Weigher also alleged that PA Thompson attended to Weigher at three to four sick calls, 
concluded there was nothing wrong with Weigher‟s back, and took no action to improve 
Weigher‟s back condition.1    
 In December 2009, the defendants filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, to which Weigher never responded.  Months later, Weigher filed a motion to 
                                                 
1
 The District Court took into account both the original and the amended 
complaint in its analysis, and also considered the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections (“DOC”) as a defendant, even though Weigher did not mention the DOC in 
his amended complaint.  Liberally construing Weigher‟s filings, we will also take into 
account both versions of the complaint.  We consider Weigher‟s claim against the DOC 




appoint counsel.  In April 2010, the District Court denied Weigher‟s motion to appoint 
counsel, and in June 2010 dismissed Weigher‟s amended complaint.  Weigher now 
appeals from those decisions and also requests appointment of counsel.
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 Our review of a District Court order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) is plenary, and we accept all well-pleaded allegations contained in the complaint 
as true while drawing all reasonable inferences in Weigher‟s favor.  Capogrosso v. 
Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009).  “To survive a motion to 
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  In deciding a 
motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether the complaint “pleads factual content 
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Id.   
 The District Court properly dismissed PHS from the action.  PHS is a private 
corporation which provides health care service at Rockview.  Weigher does not assert 
that PHS had any policy, practice, or custom which led to Weigher‟s alleged injury, or 
had any direct involvement in the alleged wrongful conduct.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Instead, Weigher‟s claim seems based on the 
argument that PHS is responsible for Dr. Symons and PA Thompson‟s alleged 
                                                 
2
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and may affirm the District 
Court‟s judgment on any basis supported by the record.  See Tourscher v. McCullough, 
184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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misconduct.  Because a § 1983 claim cannot be grounded in a theory of respondeat 
superior, Weigher‟s claim against PHS fails.  See id.  
The District Court also properly dismissed Weigher‟s claim that Dr. Symons and 
PA Thomas were deliberately indifferent to his back problems.  The Eighth 
Amendment‟s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires prison officials to 
provide basic medical treatment to inmates.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); 
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  To make out a successful claim of 
cruel and unusual punishment, the prisoner must prove that the defendant was 
deliberately indifferent to the prisoner‟s serious medical needs.  Monmouth Cnty. Corr. 
Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).  
To establish deliberate indifference, a prisoner must show that the prison 
employee knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner‟s health.  See Farmer 
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  We have found deliberate indifference where a 
prison official:  knows of a prisoner‟s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses 
to provide it; delays necessary medical treatment for non-medical reasons; or prevents a 
prisoner from receiving needed or recommended treatment.  See Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.  
“[C]laims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of 
mind, do not constitute „deliberate indifference.‟”  Id.   
Weigher‟s hazy allegations regarding Dr. Symons are not enough to establish a 
plausible claim of deliberate indifference.  First, Weigher claims Dr. Symons was 
avoiding him for four months, but does not support that allegation with any further facts.  
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Next, Weigher argues that when Dr. Symons did treat him after Weigher threw out his 
back,  the medication Dr. Symons prescribed was not effective.  Weigher provides no 
evidence that Dr. Symons purposefully prescribed ineffective medication, and as a result, 
the claim more closely resembles one of negligence as opposed to deliberate indifference.  
Finally, Weigher alleges that once Dr. Symons learned the seriousness of Weigher‟s 
condition, he “changed his tune like he was going to help.”  Weigher does not explain, 
however, how Dr. Symons has acted towards Weigher after Dr. Symons “changed his 
tune.”  Without more details, such facts cannot support a claim of deliberate indifference.   
 Weigher‟s allegations regarding PA Thompson also fall short of establishing a 
plausible claim of deliberate indifference.  Weigher alleges only that Thompson did not 
find anything wrong with Weigher‟s back and consequently did not help Weigher with 
his back problem.  We agree with the District Court that such a claim of misdiagnosis 
would sound in negligence as a malpractice suit, and does not constitute deliberate 
indifference.   
In his original complaint, Weigher also listed the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections (“DOC”), Franklin Tennis, and Jeffy [sic] Bear as defendants.  Although 
Weigher arguably did not intend to pursue claims against those defendants, since they 
were not mentioned in his amended complaint, we will briefly address the claims against 
them.  With regard to the DOC, the District Court properly determined that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars claims for damages against the DOC, a state agency that did not waive 
its sovereign immunity.  See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).  In terms of 
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Tennis and Bear — presumably Rockview prison officials — Weigher does not allege 
any claims against them beyond listing them as defendants, and accordingly does not 
state a claim for relief.   
We note that in addition to his original and amended complaint, Weigher also filed 
a “declaration” after the District Court granted a motion allowing Weigher to submit any 
additions to his amended complaint.  It is unclear whether the District Court considered 
the declaration in reaching its decision.  Liberally construing Weigher‟s filings, see 
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004), we will briefly address Weigher‟s 
declaration.   
The declaration is largely illegible and confusing, but part of it seems to claim that 
someone is “trying to kill the plaintiff,” and that if Weigher does not receive proper 
treatment “he will die.”  The declaration also mentions Bear, and seems to claim that 
Bear and others “no [sic] of [Weigher‟s] condition.”  These assertions, however, are 
simply bare allegations without sufficient facts to support them.  Weigher had a chance to 
flesh out these allegations in his original and amended complaint, and he did not take 
advantage of the opportunity to file a second amended complaint.  Because the bare 
allegations in Weigher‟s declaration are not supported by further facts in any of his 
filings, we reach the same conclusion that Weigher has failed to state a claim for relief.   
Weigher also appeals from the District Court‟s denial of his motion to appoint 
counsel.  A court may appoint counsel if a plaintiff‟s claim has arguable merit and if the 
relevant Tabron factors suggest that he or she will not be able to effectively litigate pro 
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se.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-58 (3d Cir. 1993).  Because Weigher‟s claims 
are without merit, we agree with the District Court‟s assessment that Weigher was not 
entitled to counsel.  
Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court‟s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  In 
light of our disposition, Weigher‟s request for appointment of counsel is denied as moot. 
